Washington and Lee Law Review
Volume 69

Issue 2

Article 19

Spring 3-1-2012

Applying the Stored Communications Act to the Civil Discovery of
Social Networking Sites
Rudolph J. Burshnic

Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarlycommons.law.wlu.edu/wlulr
Part of the Civil Procedure Commons, and the Computer Law Commons

Recommended Citation
Rudolph J. Burshnic, Applying the Stored Communications Act to the Civil Discovery of Social
Networking Sites, 69 Wash. & Lee L. Rev. 1259 (2012).
Available at: https://scholarlycommons.law.wlu.edu/wlulr/vol69/iss2/19
This Note is brought to you for free and open access by the Washington and Lee Law Review at Washington and
Lee University School of Law Scholarly Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Washington and Lee Law
Review by an authorized editor of Washington and Lee University School of Law Scholarly Commons. For more
information, please contact christensena@wlu.edu.

Applying the Stored Communications Act
to the Civil Discovery of Social
Networking Sites
Rudolph J. Burshnic*
Table of Contents
I. Introduction ............................................................................. 1260
II. The Stored Communications Act .......................................... 1261
III. Crispin v. Christian Audigier ................................................ 1264
IV. The Stored Communications Act’s Relationship to
General Civil Discovery of Social Networking
Site Information ...................................................................... 1271
A. Discovery Cases................................................................ 1272
B. Relevance to the Stored Communications Act ............. 1275
V. Applying Crispin v. Christian Audigier ............................... 1277
A. Privacy Settings Should Not Be Determinative
of Whether a User’s Profile Is “Private” Under
the Stored Communications Act .................................... 1278
B. Extending Crispin to the Rest of a User’s
Facebook Profile ............................................................... 1280
1. Facebook Profile Content Is Electronic
Communication Under the Stored
Communications Act ................................................. 1280
2. Facebook Acts as Both a RCS and an ECS ............ 1282
C. Determining at What Point in Time Privacy
Settings Matter ................................................................ 1286
VI. Proposed Legislative Reform ................................................. 1287
* Candidate for J.D., Washington and Lee University School of Law, May
2012. I thank Professor Brian Murchison for his insightful and invaluable
feedback on earlier drafts of this Note. I also thank my fellow law review
members for their comments and exemplary editing. Any remaining errors are
my own.

1259

1260

69 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1259 (2012)
A. Collapse the ECS/RCS Distinction ................................ 1288
B. Include an Exception in the Stored
Communications Act for Civil Litigants ....................... 1289

VII. Conclusion................................................................................ 1292
I. Introduction
Larry sued Ten Pin Lanes for personal injuries stemming from
an unfortunate bowling accident. Vanessa, Ten Pin’s attorney,
suspects Larry is malingering. Her diligent research digs up a gem—
Larry has been posting all over Facebook about his latest Aspen ski
trip, and this evidence would deal deathly blows to Larry’s claim of
physical impairment. But because Vanessa expects a long and
expensive discovery battle if she requests the Facebook information
from Larry directly, Vanessa decides to subpoena Facebook for
Larry’s profile content (including any personal information, photos,
videos, messages, wall posts, and status updates).
Vanessa will soon find out that the Stored Communications Act
(SCA)1 governs her request.2 But the application of the SCA to social
networking sites like Facebook is only a recent phenomenon.3 Various
interpretative difficulties arise when applying the SCA in this
context, and the relevant case law has provoked more questions than
answers.
This Note explores the application of the SCA in civil litigation to
aspects of social networking sites unexplored by the courts. This Note
then proposes legislative reforms to update the SCA with respect to
social networking sites in the civil litigation context. Part II
summarizes the SCA. Part III analyzes Crispin v. Christian Audigier,
Inc.,4 a landmark case applying the SCA to social networking sites.
1. Stored Communications Act, 18 U.S.C. §§ 2701–2711 (2006).
2. See Crispin v. Christian Audigier, Inc., 717 F. Supp. 2d 965, 991 (C.D.
Cal. 2010) (applying the SCA to subpoenas directed to Facebook, MySpace, and
Media Temple).
3. See id. at 977 (“Although some courts have considered the SCA’s
application to certain types of providers, none appears to have addressed
whether social networking sites fall within the ambit of the statute.”).
4. See id. at 991 (holding that private messages sent over social
networking sites are protected from subpoena by the SCA, and remanding the
issue of whether the plaintiff’s Facebook wall posts and MySpace comments
could be subpoenaed after a determination of the plaintiff’s privacy settings).
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Part IV discusses how the SCA’s application to social networking
sites relates to general civil discovery rules. Part V addresses the
questions left unanswered by Crispin and applies the decision to the
parts of a Facebook profile unexplored by the court. Finally, Part VI
proposes legislative reform.
II. The Stored Communications Act
In 1986, Congress enacted the Electronic Communications
Privacy Act (ECPA),5 part of which is a statute known as the Stored
Communications Act (SCA).6 Generally, the ECPA was enacted to
update the federal privacy law in light of new changes in
communication technology.7 These “new” communications included
“large-scale electronic mail operations, computer-to-computer data
transmissions, cellular and cordless telephones, paging devices, and
video teleconferencing.”8
More specifically, the SCA portion of the ECPA governs the
privacy of stored Internet communications in the United States.9 The
SCA has been used to address gaps in the Fourth Amendment due to
the advent of the Internet.10 The SCA “creates a set of Fourth
5. See Electronic Communications Privacy Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-508,
100 Stat. 1848 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 18 U.S.C.).
6. 18 U.S.C. §§ 2701–2711 (2006).
7. See S. REP. NO. 99-541, at 1 (1986), reprinted in 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N.
3555, 3555 (explaining that the bill amends the federal wiretap law “to protect
against the unauthorized interception of electronic communications” and “to
update and clarify Federal privacy protections and standards in light of
dramatic changes in new computer and telecommunications technologies”); id.
at 5, 3559 (noting the SCA seeks to establish “a fair balance between the privacy
expectations of American citizens and the legitimate needs of law enforcement”).
8. Id. at 2, 3556.
9. See Orin S. Kerr, A User’s Guide to the Stored Communications Act,
and a Legislator’s Guide to Amending It, 72 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1208, 1208
(2004) (describing the purpose of the SCA); Marc J. Zwillinger & Christian S.
Genetski, Criminal Discovery of Internet Communications Under the Stored
Communications Act: It’s Not a Level Playing Field, 97 J. CRIM. L. &
CRIMINOLOGY 569, 569 (2007) (“[The SCA] represents Congress’ attempt to strike
a fair balance between the privacy rights of individuals who have entrusted the
contents of their electronic communications to internet service providers and the
government’s legitimate interest in gaining access to such communications
when investigating crimes.”).
10. See Kerr, supra note 9, at 1209–13 (discussing the implications of the
Internet and Fourth Amendment privacy protection).
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Amendment-like privacy protections by statute, regulating the
relationship between government investigators and service providers
in possession of users’ private information.”11
Notably, the SCA imposes requirements that the government
must meet to compel disclosure of users’ electronic communications.12
The SCA also provides limits on voluntary disclosure by service
providers of the same type of information to the government.13
Depending on how content is classified, the SCA has a layered
protection scheme for electronic communications, ranging from a
search warrant requirement, to a § 2703(d) court order, to a mere
subpoena with prior notice.14
Whether and how the SCA protects the privacy of a
communication depends on the classification of the provider. The SCA
only protects communications stored by the two statutory categories
of providers; otherwise, only Fourth Amendment protections apply.15
In essence, the SCA provides “Fourth Amendment plus” protection to
electronic communication stored by a statutorily defined provider.16
The first statutory category is an “electronic communication
service” (ECS), defined as “any service which provides to users thereof
11. Id. at 1212.
12. See 18 U.S.C. § 2703 (2006) (providing the requirements of required
disclosure of customer communications and records when such information is
sought by a government entity); see also Kerr, supra note 9, at 1213 (“[The SCA]
creates limits on the government’s ability to compel providers to disclose
information in their possession about their customers and subscribers.”).
13. See 18 U.S.C. § 2702 (2006) (providing the limits on voluntary
disclosure of customer communications or records by a provider of remote
computing service or electronic communication service); see also Kerr, supra
note 9, at 1213 (“[The SCA] places limits on the ability of [Internet service
providers] to voluntarily disclose information about their customers and
subscribers to the government.”).
14. See 18 U.S.C. §§ 2702–2703 (2006) (providing restrictions on compelled
and voluntary disclosure of various content covered by the SCA).
15. See Kerr, supra note 9, at 1213 (“If the provider fits within [the ECS or
RCS definitions], the SCA protects the communication; otherwise, only Fourth
Amendment protections apply.”).
16. See id. (“Although the private search doctrine of the Fourth
Amendment allows private providers to make such disclosures, the SCA imposes
limitations on the circumstances in which such a disclosure can occur.”);
Zwillinger & Genetski, supra note 9, at 576 (noting that the Fourth Amendment
alone does not prevent Internet service providers (ISP) from disclosing user
communication to anyone, including the government (under the private search
and voluntary disclosure doctrines), and explaining how the SCA provides
limitations on such disclosure).
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the ability to send and receive wire or electronic communications.”17
An ECS provider is only prohibited from divulging “the contents of a
communication while in electronic storage by that service.”18
“Electronic storage” is defined as “any temporary, intermediate
storage of a wire or electronic communication incidental to the
electronic transmission thereof” or alternatively “any storage of such
communication by an [ECS] for purposes of backup protection of such
communication.”19
The second category is a “remote computing service” (RCS),
defined as an entity that provides the public “computer storage or
processing services by means of an electronic communications
system.”20 “Electronic communications system” is defined as “any
wire, radio, electromagnetic, photooptical or photoelectronic facilities
for the transmission of communications, and any computer facilities
or related electronic equipment for the electronic storage of such
communications.”21 RCS providers are prohibited from “knowingly
divulg[ing] to any person or entity the contents of any communication
which is carried or maintained on that service.”22
A provider can be a RCS, an ECS, both, or neither depending
upon what function the provider is performing.23 For example, a
provider can hold a file in temporary, intermediate “electronic
storage,” and that content is protected by ECS rules,24 while other
files held for long-term storage are governed by RCS rules.25
17. 18 U.S.C. § 2510(15) (2006); see, e.g., Warshak v. United States, 532
F.3d 521, 523 (6th Cir. 2008) (concluding that providers of basic e-mail services
are ECS providers under the SCA); Theofel v. Farey-Jones, 359 F.3d 1066, 1075
(9th Cir. 2004) (concluding that the provider of e-mail services in the case was
an ECS).
18. 18 U.S.C. § 2702(a)(1) (2006).
19. Id. § 2510(17).
20. Id. § 2711(2); see, e.g., Viacom Int’l Inc. v. YouTube, 253 F.R.D. 256, 264
(S.D.N.Y. 2008) (holding YouTube to be a RCS with respect to its storage of user
videos).
21. 18 U.S.C. § 2510(14) (2006).
22. Id. § 2702(a)(2).
23. See Kerr, supra note 9, at 1215–16 (“A provider can act as an RCS with
respect to some communications, an ECS with respect to other communications,
and neither an RCS nor an ECS with respect to other communications.”).
24. See 18 U.S.C. §§ 2702(a)(1), 2703(a) (2006) (providing the rules
governing an ECS).
25. See id. §§ 2702(a)(2), 2703(b) (providing the rules governing a RCS).
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Despite vast technological advancement since the SCA’s passage,
Congress has yet to update the SCA to conform to modern day
innovations related to e-mail and cell phones, among other things.26
As a result, courts have difficulty applying the SCA to new
technologies. The Crispin decision is a prime example.
III. Crispin v. Christian Audigier
The SCA is notoriously complicated and confusing,27 and its
application to social networking sites has only further muddied the
waters. In May 2010, a federal district court applied the SCA to
determine whether the defendants could subpoena the plaintiff’s
electronic communications from Facebook, Media Temple, and
MySpace.28 This case appears to be the first to apply the SCA to data
on social networking sites.29 Plaintiff, an artist named Buckley
Crispin, filed an action against defendants Christian Audigier,
Christian Audigier, Inc., and their various sublicensees, alleging that
the defendants used Crispin’s art in violation of the alleged oral
agreement between the parties.30 Defendants served subpoenas duces
tecum on the three social networking websites (Facebook, Medial
Temple, and MySpace) in their capacity as third-party businesses.31
26. See Mark Sidoti et al., How Private Is Facebook Under the SCA?, 8
INTERNET L. & STRATEGY, Nov. 2010, at 1, 4 (“Congress has not amended the
SCA to keep pace with changing technology. Rather, courts have had to lead the
charge in applying the decades-old statute to modern Internet technology and
electronic communication disclosure issues.”).
27. See, e.g., Konop v. Hawaiian Airlines, Inc., 302 F.3d 868, 874 (9th Cir.
2002) (acknowledging the difficulty in interpreting the Act because “the ECPA
was written prior to the advent of the Internet and the World Wide Web”);
United States v. Smith, 155 F.3d 1051, 1055 (9th Cir. 1998) (describing the
ECPA, and its subpart, the SCA, as “a complex, often convoluted area of law”);
Kerr, supra note 9, at 1208 (“Despite [the SCA’s] obvious importance, the
statute remains poorly understood. Courts, legislators, and even legal scholars
have had a hard time making sense of the SCA.”).
28. See Crispin v. Christian Audigier, Inc., 717 F. Supp. 2d 965, 971 (C.D.
Cal. 2010) (applying the SCA to subpoenas directed to Facebook, MySpace, and
Media Temple).
29. See id. at 977 (“Although some courts have considered the SCA’s
application to certain types of providers, none appears to have addressed
whether social-networking sites fall within the ambit of the statute.”).
30. Id. at 968.
31. Id. at 968–69.
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The subpoenas sought Crispin’s basic subscriber information, all
communications between Crispin and a tattoo artist named Bryan
Callan, and all communication that referred or related to Audigier,
Christian Audigier, Inc., the Ed Hardy brand, or any of the
sublicensee defendants.32 Crispin moved to quash the subpoenas. He
argued, among other things, that the subpoenas sought electronic
communications that third-party Internet service providers are
prohibited from disclosing under the SCA.33 The magistrate judge
rejected Crispin’s motion to quash on SCA grounds and held that the
social networking sites were not subject to the SCA.34 Crispin then
filed a motion to reconsider in the Central District of California.35
As an initial matter, the court had to decide whether Crispin had
standing to challenge the subpoenas directed at the social networking
sites.36 Ordinarily a party does not have standing to quash a
subpoena issued to a nonparty unless that party can claim a personal
right or privilege to the information that is requested from the
nonparty.37 In this context, “an individual has a personal right in
information in his or her profile and inbox on a social networking site
and his or her webmail inbox in the same way that an individual has
a personal right in employment and bank records.”38 As a result,
Crispin had standing to bring the motion to quash.39
Next, the court had to determine how the SCA applied to the
third-party social networking sites. In deciding whether SCA
protection covered the content on Facebook, Media Temple, and
MySpace, the court had to determine whether those services were
32. Id. at 969.
33. Id.
34. Id. at 969–70.
35. Id. at 970.
36. See id. at 973 (“Defendants [argue] that Crispin cannot assert the
rights of Media Temple, Facebook, and MySpace, none of whom moved to quash
the subpoenas directed to them.”).
37. See id. (“‘Ordinarily a party has no standing to seek to quash a
subpoena issued to someone who is not party to the action, unless the objecting
party claims some personal right or privilege with regard to the documents
sought.’” (quoting 9A CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT ET AL., FEDERAL PRACTICE AND
PROCEDURE § 2459 (3d ed. 2008))).
38. Id. at 974.
39. See id. (“As with bank and employment records, this personal right is
sufficient to confer standing to move to quash a subpoena seeking such
information.”).
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ECS or RCS under the SCA, depending upon what function the
services were performing.40 Again, an ECS is defined as “any service
which provides to users thereof the ability to send and receive wire or
electronic communications.”41 Various courts have found that
providers of e-mail services are ECS providers.42 The Crispin court
analogized the private messaging services that Media Temple,
Facebook, and MySpace provide with these types of e-mail services
and held that the three sites at issue in the case are generally ECS
providers.43
As additional support for this conclusion, the court noted the
authority on private electronic bulletin board services (BBS)44: “Court
precedent and legislative history establish that the SCA’s definition of
an ECS provider was intended to reach a private BBS.”45 But SCA
protection “require[s] that the BBS be restricted in some fashion; a
completely public BBS does not merit protection under the SCA.”46
Because Facebook and MySpace restrict viewing of wall postings and
comments to those with access to the user’s profile, “there is no basis
for distinguishing between a restricted-access BBS and a user’s
Facebook wall or MySpace comments.”47
Next, the court had to determine whether content sought by the
subpoenas constituted “electronic storage” within the meaning of the

40. Id. at 976.
41. 18 U.S.C. § 2510(15) (2006).
42. See, e.g., Warshak v. United States, 532 F.3d 521, 523 (6th Cir. 2008)
(concluding that providers of basic e-mail services are ECS providers under the
SCA); Theofel v. Farey-Jones, 359 F.3d 1066, 1075 (9th Cir. 2004) (concluding
that the provider of e-mail services in the case was an ECS).
43. See Crispin v. Christian Audigier, Inc., 717 F. Supp. 2d 965, 980 (C.D.
Cal. 2010) (“Recognizing that all three sites provide private messaging or email
services, the court is compelled to apply the voluminous case law cited above
that establishes that such services constitute ECS.”). Later, the court noted that
“[t]here . . . is no basis for distinguishing between Media Temple’s webmail and
Facebook’s and MySpace’s private messaging, on the one hand, and traditional
web-based email on the other.” Id. at 981–82.
44. See id. at 980 (noting that Facebook wall postings and MySpace
comments “are accessible only to those users plaintiff selects” and finding the
authority on private electronic bulletin board services “relevant, if not
controlling”).
45. Id. at 981.
46. See id. (citing case law and SCA legislative history).
47. Id.
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Act.48 As mentioned above, an ECS provider is prohibited from
divulging only “the contents of a communication while in electronic
storage by that service.”49 There are two definitions of “electronic
storage” in the Act. “Electronic storage” is first defined as “any
temporary, intermediate storage of a wire or electronic
communication incidental to the electronic transmission thereof,”50
and second, as “any storage of such communication by an [ECS] for
purposes of backup protection of such communication.”51 The court
held that the “private” unopened messages were protected because
the entities were acting as ECS providers and holding the unopened
messages in “temporary, intermediate” electronic storage.52
With respect to the opened and retained messages, the entities
were held to be RCS providers providing electronic storage, and the
messages were held to be protected.53 Again, RCS is defined as an
entity that provides the public “computer storage or processing
services by means of an electronic communications system.”54 The
court applied case law holding that when e-mail messages were
opened, the entity ceased to be an ECS and instead became a RCS
providing remote storage for the e-mail.55 The court quashed the
subpoenas seeking the private messages, opened or unopened,
because both were held to be protected under the SCA.56
48. Id. at 982.
49. 18 U.S.C. § 2702(a)(1) (2006).
50. Id. § 2510(17)(A).
51. Id. § 2510(17)(B).
52. See Crispin, 717 F. Supp. 2d at 987 (“As respects messages that have
not yet been opened, those entities operate as ECS providers and the messages
in are electronic storage because they fall within the definition of ‘temporary,
intermediate storage’ under § 2510(17)(A).”). The court relied on precedent
applying the SCA to e-mail messages stored on an Internet service provider’s
server for this conclusion. See id. at 982 (noting case law holding that unopened
e-mail messages are covered under the “electronic storage” definition in 18
U.S.C. § 2510(17)(A) as “temporary, intermediate storage of a wire or electronic
communication incidental to the electronic transmission thereof”). The court
then analogized the e-mails in this context to unopened messages in Media
Temple’s webmail service and Facebook’s and MySpace’s private messaging. Id.
53. See id. at 987 (“As respects messages that have been opened and
retained by Crispin, under the reasoning of Weaver and Flagg, and the dicta in
Theofel, the three entities operate as RCS providers providing storage under
§ 2702(a)(2).”).
54. 18 U.S.C. § 2711(2) (2006).
55. See Crispin, 717 F. Supp. 2d at 987 (discussing Weaver).
56. See id. at 991 (reversing the lower court order to the extent that it
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Facebook wall postings and MySpace comments, on the other
hand, presented “a distinct and more difficult question.”57 Wall
postings and comments do not have a “temporary, intermediate step”
similar to the e-mail process58 and thus could not be protected as
temporary, intermediate storage.59 Instead, the court found that
Facebook and MySpace are ECS providers with respect to wall
postings and comments and that the content is in electronic storage
for “backup purposes.”60 This part of the decision relied heavily on a
Ninth Circuit decision, Konop v. Hawaiian Airlines, Inc.61 Konop
subpoenaed any “private” messaging).
57. Id. at 988.
58. See id. at 989 (“Unlike an email, there is no step whereby a Facebook
wall posting must be opened, at which point it is deemed received.”).
59. See id. (“[A] Facebook wall posting or MySpace comment is not
protectable as a form of temporary, intermediate storage.”).
60. See id. (holding that “Facebook and MySpace are ECS providers as
respects wall postings and comments and that such communications are in
electronic storage” for backup purposes).
61. See Konop v. Hawaiian Airlines, Inc., 302 F.3d 868, 880 (9th Cir. 2002)
(holding, among other things, that the district court improperly granted
summary judgment to Hawaiian Airlines on Konop’s SCA claim). This court had
to decide whether the district court properly dismissed Konop’s SCA claim
against Hawaiian Airlines, Inc. (Hawaiian). Robert Konop, a pilot for Hawaiian,
alleged that Hawaiian viewed his website without authorization, disclosed the
contents of the site, and took other actions in violation of, among other things,
the SCA. Id. at 872. Konop’s website contained a bulletin where he posted
comments critical of his employer, its officers, and his current airline union. Id.
Access to the website was controlled by requiring visitors to log in with a user
name and password. Id. Anyone accessing the site had to agree to terms and
conditions that prohibited any member of Hawaiian’s management from viewing
the website and prohibited disclosure of the website’s contents to anyone else.
Id. at 872–73. The Hawaiian vice president, James Davis, accessed the site by
using the usernames of two of Konop’s fellow Hawaiian pilots. Id. at 873. Konop
argued on appeal that Davis accessed a stored communication without the
proper authorization under the SCA. Id. at 879. The parties stipulated that the
website was an “electronic communications service” and that the website was in
“electric storage.” Id. The court assumed, without deciding, that Davis’s conduct
constituted “access without authorization” to “a facility through which an
electronic communication service is provided.” Id. at 879–80. The court noted
that “the plain language of § 2701(c)(2) [of the SCA] indicates that only a ‘user’
of the service can authorize a third party’s access to the communication.” Id. at
880. “User” is defined as “one who 1) uses the service and 2) is duly authorized
to do so.” Id. The court found that neither pilot who allowed Davis to access the
site could be found to be a “user” when they authorized Davis to access it. Id.
Thus, the court reversed the district court’s grant of summary judgment to
Hawaiian on the SCA claim. Id.
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addressed the application of the SCA to a secure website containing a
bulletin board.62 The Konop court concluded that the private bulletin
board at issue was in fact covered by the SCA.63 The parties agreed
that the website containing the bulletin board was an ECS provider
and the communication it stored was electronic storage under
§ 2510(17).64 The Konop court did not, however, indicate whether the
electronic storage was held for temporary and immediate storage or
for backup.65 The Crispin court reasoned that the bulletin postings in
Konop could not be considered to be in temporary, intermediate
storage.66 Because the Konop court found the postings to be within
“electronic storage,” the only other option under the SCA is for the
postings to be stored for “backup purposes.”67 Thus, “it appears that
the passive action of failing to delete a BBS post, which is in all
material ways analogous to a Facebook wall posting or a MySpace
comment, also results in that post being stored for backup
purposes.”68
The court, however, hedged its reasoning and alternatively held
Facebook and MySpace to be RCS providers with respect to wall
postings and comments.69 The court found persuasive Viacom
International Inc. v. YouTube,70 which held YouTube to be a RCS
62. Id. at 872.
63. See id. at 875 (noting that the legislative history of the ECPA suggests
Congress wanted to protect private communications like e-mail and private
electronic bulletin boards).
64. See id. at 879 (“The parties agree that the relevant ‘electronic
communications service’ is Konop’s website, and that the website was in
‘electronic storage.’”).
65. See Crispin v. Christian Audigier, Inc., 717 F. Supp. 2d 965, 988 (C.D.
Cal. 2010) (noting that the Konop court “did not indicate whether the electronic
storage was temporary and intermediate or for backup purposes”).
66. See id. at 989 (“Because Facebook wall postings and MySpace
comments, on the one hand, and bulletin postings on a website such as Konop’s,
on the other, cannot be considered to be in temporary, intermediate storage, the
court interprets Konop as holding that the postings, once made, are stored for
backup purposes.”).
67. See id. (“This reading of Konop is consistent with Theofel and Quon,
which held that email messages and pager text-messages, respectively, were
held for backup purposes once read.”).
68. Id.
69. See id. at 990 (“In the alternative, the court holds that Facebook and
MySpace are RCS providers as respects the wall postings and comments.”).
70. See Viacom Int’l Inc. v. YouTube, 253 F.R.D. 256, 265 (S.D.N.Y. 2008)
(holding, among other things, that plaintiffs cannot compel YouTube to produce
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provider because “it provided storage services for the user . . . it stored
the video on a web page for the benefit of the user and those the user
designates.”71 Like the wall postings and comments, the private
videos sought in the Viacom case “are accessible to a limited set of
users selected by the poster and are stored on a page provided by the
website.”72
The subpoenas for the Facebook wall postings and MySpace
comments were remanded to the magistrate judge for further
findings of fact.73 Whether this information could be subpoenaed
“private” user videos because YouTube is prohibited from doing so under the
ECPA). The various plaintiffs in this case brought copyright infringement
claims against YouTube and Google. In one motion, plaintiffs sought to compel
defendant YouTube to produce copies of various “private” videos “which can only
be viewed by others authorized by the user who posted each of them, as well as
specified data related to them.” Id. at 264. The court found that YouTube, as a
“remote computing service,” could not produce the videos under SCA § 2702
because that statute does not allow a RCS to divulge “any electronic
communications stored on behalf of their subscribers.” Id. Also, the statute
contains “no exception for disclosure of such communications pursuant to civil
discovery requests.” Id. The court noted that this prohibition only applies when
the provider “‘is not authorized to access the contents of any such
communications for purposes of providing any services other than storage or
computer processing,’” but that defendants had satisfied this condition. Id. at
264 n.8 (quoting SCA § 2702(a)(2)(B)).
The plaintiffs claimed that the users authorized disclosure of the contents of
the private videos, which would allow YouTube to divulge such information
under SCA § 2702(b)(3), by consenting to YouTube’s Use and Privacy Policy. Id.
But the court found that none of the clauses in the Policy could be construed as
a “grant of permission from users to reveal to plaintiffs the videos that they
have designated as private and chosen to share only with specified recipients.”
Id. at 265. Thus, the motion to compel production of the private video content
was denied. Id.
The plaintiffs also requested “non-content data” (for example, a video’s view
count) about the videos. Id. They argued that “such data are relevant to show
whether videos designated as private are in fact shared with numerous
members of the public and therefore not protected by the ECPA, and then to
obtain discovery on their claim . . . that users abuse YouTube’s privacy feature”
to share videos but evade detection by the video’s owners. Id. The court granted
this request, finding that the plaintiffs “need the requested non-content data so
that they can properly argue their construction of the ECPA on the merits and
have an opportunity to obtain discovery of allegedly infringing private videos
claimed to be public.” Id.
71. Crispin v. Christian Audigier, Inc., 717 F. Supp. 2d 965, 990 (C.D. Cal.
2010).
72. Id.
73. Id. at 991.
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under the SCA depended upon whether the user’s wall was open to
the public or restricted in some manner: as the court noted, a “review
of the plaintiff’s privacy settings would definitively settle the
question.”74
The Crispin decision is important because it provided insight
into how the SCA can be interpreted in the social networking site
context, and it highlighted the difficulties in doing so. At the same
time, Crispin raised many new questions: How restricted must a
user’s content be to be subject to subpoena? Are status updates and
profile information subject to SCA protection? Can a user’s list of
“friends” be subject to subpoena under the SCA? Is content private
because one must be a site subscriber to access the profile or does
access have to be limited to a user’s friends? If the user changes his
privacy settings in the middle of litigation, before the subpoena is
granted, is discovery precluded?
IV. The Stored Communications Act’s Relationship to General Civil
Discovery of Social Networking Site Information
Before discussing the implications of Crispin, this Part addresses
the important parallel issue of general civil discovery between parties
and how it relates to the subpoena of a third-party social networking
site. The defendants in Crispin (and Vanessa, our hypothetical
defendant’s lawyer) chose to pursue the plaintiff’s information by
serving a subpoena on social networking websites. In federal courts,
subpoenas in civil litigation are governed generally by Federal Rule of
Civil Procedure 45.75 But a litigant’s Facebook profile or MySpace
messages are also subject to general civil discovery and the
accompanying rules.76

74. Id.
75. See FED. R. CIV. P. 45 (providing requirements for issuing a subpoena,
among other things).
76. See Tonn Petersen, Redefining “Privacy” in the Era of SocialNetworking, ADVOCATE, Sept. 2010, at 27, 27 (noting that the defendant in
Crispin “could still seek information directly from the plaintiff in the case”);
Sidoti et al., supra note 26, at 5 (“[A] litigant seeking to obtain another party’s
private online communications may be able to avoid application of the SCA
altogether by simply serving a Rule 34 document request directly on the party
whose communications are sought.”).
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Federal discovery requests in civil cases are governed generally
by Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 26.77 The scope of a discovery
request is broad: parties may request discovery “regarding any
nonprivileged matter that is relevant to any party’s claim or
defense.”78 Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 26(b)(2) provides some
limitations on this otherwise broad scope of permissible civil
discovery.79 Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 34 provides more specific
rules regarding the discovery of “electronically stored information” or
ESI.80 While this Note’s main focus will not be the issue of civil
discovery in the social networking context, it is helpful to compare
this method of information gathering with the civil subpoena and the
rules for parties and nonparties to civil litigation. This merits a brief
discussion of the recent case law regarding the discovery of social
networking account information—a relatively new legal issue.81
A. Discovery Cases
Mackelprang v. Fidelity National Title Agency of Nevada, Inc.82
involved a sexual harassment suit based on allegations stemming
from the plaintiff’s time as an employee at Fidelity.83 During
77. See FED. R. CIV. P. 26 (providing duty to disclose discovery, and the
relevant general provisions regarding discovery).
78. Id. 26(b)(1).
79. See id. 26(b)(2)(C) (allowing the court to limit frequency or extent of
discovery based on various factors).
80. See id. 34 (providing for discovery of electronically stored information,
but within the scope of Rule 26(b)).
81. See EEOC v. Simply Storage Mgmt., LLC, 270 F.R.D 430, 434 (S.D. Ind.
2010) (discussing the principles applicable to the discovery of social networking
sites: “[D]espite the popularity of [social networking sites] and the frequency
with which this issue might be expected to arise, remarkably few published
decisions provide guidance on the issues presented here”); see also Evan E.
North, Note, Facebook Isn’t Your Space Anymore: Discovery of Social
Networking Websites, 58 U. KAN. L. REV. 1279, 1290–93 (2010) (discussing recent
developments in this area).
82. See Mackelprang v. Fidelity Nat’l Title Agency of Nev., Inc., No. 2:06CV-00788-JCM-GWF, 2007 WL 119149, at *6 (D. Nev. Jan. 9, 2007) (holding
that because the defendants “have failed to demonstrate a relevant basis for
obtaining production of Plaintiff’s Myspace.com private email messages based
on Defendants’ suspicion that they may contain sexually explicit or sexually
promiscuous content[,]” the defendant’s motion to compel plaintiff’s consent to
produce these messages must be denied).
83. See id. at *1 (noting various claims by the plaintiff).
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discovery, defendant Fidelity first attempted to subpoena MySpace
for all the records of the plaintiff’s two accounts on the site, including
her private e-mail communications.84 MySpace produced certain
“public” information about the accounts, but “refused to produce
private email messages on either account in the absence of a search
warrant or letter of consent to production by the owner of the
account.”85 Subsequently, plaintiff Mackelprang refused defendant’s
request for her consent to the release of the private messages, on the
grounds that the information is “irrelevant and improperly invades”
her privacy.86
Fidelity then moved to compel production of Mackelprang’s
private e-mails on MySpace.87 The court denied this request, in part
because of factors relating to evidence rules governing admissibility of
sexual behavior, which in turn are relevant to whether such
information is discoverable.88 But the court did not imply that the
MySpace e-mails were not discoverable, and instead stated the
opposite: “The proper method for obtaining such information,
however, is to serve upon Plaintiff limited requests for production of
relevant [MySpace] email communications.”89
Equal Employment Opportunity Commission v. Simply Storage
Management, LLC90 also involved discovery of social networking sites
in a sexual harassment suit.91 The Equal Employment Opportunity
Commission (EEOC) requested a discovery conference to determine
whether the two claimants in this case had to produce their
“profiles”92 and other communication from their Facebook and
84. See id. at *2 (“Defendant Fidelity thereafter served a subpoena on
Myspace.com . . . to produce all records for these accounts, including private
email communications exchanged between Plaintiff and others.”).
85. Id.
86. Id.
87. Id.
88. See id. at *6 (“[T]he probative value of such evidence does not
substantially outweigh its unfair prejudicial effect to Plaintiff.”).
89. Id. at *8.
90. See EEOC v. Simply Storage Mgmt., LLC, 270 F.R.D. 430, 435 (S.D.
Ind. 2010) (holding that social networking site discovery was proper, but the
scope of such discovery must be limited by relevancy).
91. See id. at 432 (describing the EEOC sexual harassment suit on behalf
of two claimants, and the ensuing discovery dispute over the scope of social
networking site information).
92. See id. at 432 n.1 (interpreting “profile” to mean “any content—
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MySpace accounts.93 The parties disagreed about the proper scope of
discovery involving the various requests.94 The EEOC, representing
the two claimants, objected to the requests as overly broad and
irrelevant.95 The EEOC also objected on the grounds that the
requests were unduly burdensome because they infringed on the
claimants’ privacy, in addition to being harassing and
embarrassing.96
The court then determined the proper scope of the discovery
requests in light of the emotional distress claims at issue. As a
preliminary matter, the court determined that social networking site
content is not barred from discovery because it is made “private” by
the user.97 Next, while the court agreed that social networking site
discovery was appropriate, the court found that its scope had to be
limited to the circumstances (in other words, relevant within Rule
26).98 “[T]he appropriate scope of relevance is any profiles, postings, or
messages (including status updates, wall comments, causes joined,
groups joined, activity streams, blog entries) and [social networking
site] applications . . . that reveal, refer, or relate to any emotion,
feeling, or mental state” and also “communications that reveal, refer,
or relate to events that could reasonably be expected to produce a
significant emotion, feeling, or mental state.”99 The same test would
including postings, pictures, blogs, messages, personal information, lists of
‘friends’ or causes joined—that the user has placed or created online by using
her user account”).
93. Id. at 432.
94. See id. (noting disputed discovery requests over photographs, videos,
and electronic copies of profile pages from Facebook and MySpace). The requests
for electronic copies of the profile pages included “all status updates, messages,
wall comments, causes joined, groups joined, activity streams, blog entries,
detail, blurbs, comments, and applications.” Id.
95. Id.
96. See id. (“The EEOC objects to production of all SNS content (and to
similar deposition questioning) on the grounds that the requests are overbroad,
not relevant, unduly burdensome because they improperly infringe on
claimants’ privacy, and will harass and embarrass the claimants.”).
97. See id. at 434 (“[A] person’s expectation and intent that her
communications be maintained as private is not a legitimate basis for shielding
those communications from discovery.”).
98. See id. at 435 (“It is reasonable to expect severe emotional or mental
injury to manifest itself in some SNS content, and an examination of that
content might reveal whether onset occurred, when, and the degree of
distress.”).
99. Id. at 436.
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apply to photographs and videos.100 Third-party communications had
to be produced if the claimants’ own communications put them in
“context.”101
In Romano v. Steelcase, Inc.,102 Romano brought a personal
injury action against Steelcase. Steelcase sought an order giving
access to Romano’s Facebook and MySpace accounts, believing it
could find information that would discredit Romano’s claims
regarding her injuries.103 The court mentioned reviewing the SCA but
did not offer any related analysis.104 Presumably, the court did not
find that it governed the case. Under the New York state civil
discovery standard of “material and necessary,” the court found that
Romano’s Facebook and MySpace accounts were both material and
necessary to Steelcase’s defense, and that the account information
could lead to admissible evidence.105
B. Relevance to the Stored Communications Act
As the prior discussion shows, parties in civil litigation are
subject to discovery procedures (including requests for production and
subpoenas), but nonparties can also be compelled to produce
information by order of a subpoena.106 A party may attempt to
100. See id. (“The same test set forth above can be used to determine
whether particular pictures should be produced.”).
101. See id. (“Third-party communications to [claimants] must be produced
if they place these claimants’ own communications in context.”).
102. See Romano v. Steelcase, Inc., 907 N.Y.S.2d 650, 654 (N.Y. Sup. Ct.
2010) (holding information from Romano’s Facebook and MySpace accounts
discoverable).
103. See id. at 653 (“Steelcase contends that a review of the public portions
of [Romano’s] Facebook and MySpace pages reveals that she has an active
lifestyle and has traveled to Florida and Pennsylvania during the time period
she claims that her injuries prohibited such activity.”). After looking at the
public portions of her profile, Steelcase sought to question Romano at her
deposition and sought a request for authorization to access her Facebook and
MySpace accounts. Id. Romano did not cooperate with either request. Id.
104. See id. at 651–52 (“The Court has reviewed . . . the applicable federal
statutory law, specifically the Stored Communications Act . . . .”).
105. See id. at 654 (“[T]here is a reasonable likelihood that the private
portions of her sites may contain further evidence such as information with
regard to her activities and enjoyment of life, all of which are material and
relevant to the defense of this action.”).
106. See FED. R. CIV. P. 45 (providing the rule for civil subpoenas).
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subpoena a nonparty’s information through a Rule 45 request, but
this request cannot overcome the protections provided in the SCA.107
There are exceptions to these SCA protections, but “the exceptions
enumerated in § 2702(b) do not include civil discovery subpoenas.”108
The lack of an exception in the SCA for civil discovery subpoenas
explains why the SCA, rather than the civil procedure rules, governed
the Crispin decision.109
On the other hand, a court may force a party in the course of civil
discovery to “consent” to produce electronically stored information
within its “control” under Rule 34, thus avoiding the SCA issue.110
107. See, e.g., In re Subpoena Duces Tecum to AOL, LLC, 550 F. Supp. 2d
606, 609 (E.D.V.A. 2008) (upholding a magistrate judge’s order quashing a
subpoena requesting a nonparty’s e-mails from AOL because there is no
exception in the SCA for such disclosure).
108. Id. at 611; see also Crispin v. Christian Audigier, Inc., 717 F. Supp. 2d
965, 975 (C.D. Cal. 2010) (“The [SCA] does not mention service of a civil
subpoena duces tecum.”); Timothy G. Ackermann, Consent and Discovery Under
the Stored Communications Act, 56 FED. LAW. 42, 43 (Dec. 2009) (“[Section] 2702
of the SCA does not provide a general exception for complying with civil
discovery.”); Zwillinger & Genetski, supra note 9, at 587 (“[T]he SCA contains no
exception for civil discovery . . . .”).
109. See Crispin, 717 F. Supp. 2d at 971 (applying the SCA to subpoena
requests to nonparty social networking sites). This Note, in Part VI.B., argues
that the SCA should include a civil litigant exception that it now lacks.
110. See Flagg v. City of Detroit, 252 F.R.D. 346, 363 (E.D. Mich. 2008)
(holding that the SCA does not prevent Defendant from giving consent to a
third-party to release text messages relevant to discovery). The Court stated:
Defendant City is both able and obligated to give its consent, as
subscriber, to SkyTel’s retrieval of text messages so that the City may
comply with a Rule 34 request for their production . . . . [A] party has
an obligation under Rule 34 to produce materials within its control,
and this obligation carries with it the attendant duty to take the
steps necessary to exercise this control and retrieve the requested
documents . . . . [A] party’s disinclination to exercise this control is
immaterial, just as it is immaterial whether a party might prefer not
to produce documents in its possession or custody.
Id.; see also Ackermann, supra note 108, at 43 (“Section 2702(b)(3) of the SCA
does, however, create an exception based on lawful consent that applies to civil
discovery.”); Steve C. Bennett, Civil Discovery of Social Networking Information,
39 SW. L. REV. 413, 423 (2010) (“[A litigant] may be required to provide consent
for access to social networking sites that contain [relevant] information . . . . [I]f
the litigant has the ability to obtain ‘control’ over such information by providing
consent to the ISP, then the litigant must provide such consent as part of its
discovery obligations.”). But there is at least one authority to the contrary. See
J.T. Shannon Lumber Co. v. Gilco Lumber Inc., No. 2:07-CV-119-SA-SAA, 2008
WL 4755370, at *1 (N.D. Miss. Oct. 29, 2008) (denying plaintiff’s motion to
compel defendant’s consent for information held by ISPs). The court reasoned
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Consequently, in the context of civil litigation, the SCA is most
relevant to requests for electronically stored information of
nonparties, or for parties who forgo the discovery route and subpoena
a nonparty ECS or RCS for the opposing party’s information. Thus,
this Note focuses on the SCA’s application to civil subpoenas served
on social networking sites outside of the normal discovery context
between parties.
Nevertheless, the availability of discovery procedures does not
undermine the importance of the application of the SCA in the social
networking context. Again, the SCA still protects nonparties who are
not subject to the discovery process.111 Also, litigants have incentives
to retrieve information directly from a social networking site because
this tactic is easier than obtaining the information from the opposing
parties themselves.112 Accordingly, it is still important that there be
clear standards for what the SCA does and does not protect when
litigants subpoena social networking sites for information.
V. Applying Crispin v. Christian Audigier
Crispin provided two important answers. First, social
networking site information is subject to protection under the SCA.
The court determined that the SCA protects information on
Facebook, MySpace, and Media Temple because, depending on what
function they are serving, the sites are either ECS or RCS.113 Second,
that this request would allow an “end run around the [SCA],” which implies that
the court believed the SCA should still preclude the request. Id. In any event,
“the plaintiff has other means of obtaining any discoverable information at its
disposal, which would not be contrary to the Stored Communications Act.” Id.
111. See, e.g., In re Subpoena Duces Tecum, 550 F. Supp. 2d at 609
(upholding a magistrate judge’s order quashing a subpoena requesting a
nonparty’s e-mails from AOL because there is no exception in the SCA for such
disclosure).
112. See Derek S. Witte, Your Opponent Does Not Need a Friend Request to
See Your Page: Social Networking Sites and Electronic Discovery, 41 MCGEORGE
L. REV. 891, 897 (2010) (“Because an individual Facebook [user] does not have
direct access to the servers upon which his or her pages are stored [or access to
archived information] . . . the best way to discover this potentially rich ESI . . . is
by requesting it directly from the sites themselves.”).
113. See Crispin v. Christian Audigier, Inc., 717 F. Supp. 2d 965, 987 (C.D.
Cal. 2010) (holding that the social networking sites are ECS when they hold
private unopened private messages but RCS regarding opened and retained
private messages). When Facebook or MySpace holds a wall post or comment,
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privacy settings matter. Crispin’s privacy settings on his Facebook
and MySpace accounts would “definitively settle the question”
whether the defendants could subpoena Crispin’s wall posts and
comments.114 Private messages, on the other hand, were analogized
to e-mails and were held to be protected.115
But even with the guidance of Crispin, social networking sites
fail to find a good fit within the statutory framework of the SCA.
Crispin left important questions unanswered, particularly regarding
the issue of privacy settings.116 This Part addresses the issue of what
should be sufficiently “private” for protection under the SCA,117
applies Crispin to the various Facebook profile parts that the court
did not address,118 and addresses the question of when, in the course
of litigation, a user’s privacy settings are relevant.119
A. Privacy Settings Should Not Be Determinative of Whether a User’s
Profile Is “Private” Under the Stored Communications Act
How private must a user’s information be to be protected?
Generally, the SCA prohibits voluntary disclosure from a public
provider of electronic communications120 but does not protect
electronic communications “readily accessible to the general
public.”121
they operate as ECS or RCS. See id. at 989–90 (holding that the sites are ECS in
this regard, but alternatively holding that they are RCS).
114. Id. at 991.
115. See id. (quashing a subpoena for webmail and private messages
because they are “inherently private” and “not readily accessible to the general
public”).
116. See, e.g., Alan Klein et al., Social Networking Sites: Subject to
Discovery?, THE NAT’L L.J., Aug. 23, 2010, at 15, 19 (“Is content private if one
must be a subscriber to access it, or must access be limited to a user’s ‘friends,’
which on Facebook may number in the thousands?”); Petersen, supra note 76, at
27–28 (“Does the definition of privacy merely turn on whether a user chooses a
public or private setting by the click of a mouse? If so, can a user involved in
litigation make critical information inaccessible simply by changing privacy
settings on his or her Facebook or MySpace pages?”).
117. Infra Part V.A.
118. Infra Part V.B.
119. Infra Part V.C.
120. See 18 U.S.C. § 2702 (2006) (providing the voluntary disclosure rules
and exceptions).
121. See id. § 2511(2)(g) (“It shall not be unlawful under [the SCA] for any
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Crispin implicitly rejected the argument that signing up for a
Facebook account to access another user’s profile is a sufficient
privacy bar: “[E]ither the general public had access to plaintiff’s
Facebook wall and MySpace comments, or access was limited to a
few.”122 The general public would necessarily have to sign up for
Facebook to access the profile.123 Apparently, the court viewed this
registration step as irrelevant to the privacy determination.
Also, according to the court, a user with numerous “friends” on a
social networking site would still have “private” wall posts, so long as
the proper privacy settings were in place.124 To base a rule on the
number of friends would result in “arbitrary line-drawing” and would
lead to “anomalous result[s].”125 While the court’s concerns are
legitimate, one could imagine a Facebook profile that can only be
viewed by a user’s friends but still falls within the statutory language
of “readily accessible to the general public.”126 For example, celebrity
Facebook profiles are relatively common. A celebrity could restrict her
profile only to her “friends,” yet her “friends” could be
indiscriminately “accepted” without regard to who they might be. In
practical terms, this hypothetical Facebook profile would be “readily
accessible to the general public.” Simply because a user’s profile is set
to “private” should not foreclose the possibility that the profile still

person . . . to intercept or access an electronic communication made through an
electronic communication system that is configured so that such electronic
communication is readily accessible to the general public.”).
122. Crispin v. Christian Audigier, Inc., 717 F. Supp. 2d 965, 991 (C.D. Cal.
2010).
123. See Facebook, Sign Up for Facebook, http://www.facebook.com/r.php
(last visited Apr. 10, 2012) (requiring a first and last name, e-mail address,
password, gender, and birthday to create a Facebook account) (on file with the
Washington and Lee Law Review). Crispin also covered MySpace, but this Note
only focuses on Facebook because Facebook is today’s preeminent social
networking site and because the discussion of a single social networking site, as
opposed to multiple, is preferable for the sake of clarity.
124. See Crispin, 717 F. Supp. 2d at 990 (noting that the number of
plaintiff’s Facebook friends who can view a wall post “has no legal significance”).
125. See id. (“[B]asing a rule on the number of users who can access
information would result in arbitrary line-drawing and likely in the anomalous
result that businesses such as law firms, which may have thousands of
employees who can access documents in storage, would be excluded from the
statute.”). While this discussion was within the court’s discussion of the sites as
RCS, the court presumably would apply the same logic to the ECS context.
126. 18 U.S.C. § 2511(2)(g) (2006).
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may be readily accessible to the general public and thus unprotected
by the SCA.
B. Extending Crispin to the Rest of a User’s Facebook Profile
While Crispin only addressed private messages and wall posts or
comments in the social networking context, there is a plethora of
other information that a litigant could seek. Facebook allows a user to
update his status, post videos and photos, and to include various
profile information.127 As with wall posts, Facebook allows a user to
restrict the previously mentioned information to either all, some
(including, for example, an option for only friends in your network), or
none of his friends.128 Or, a user can leave this information open to
any Facebook user.129 This subpart applies the logic of Crispin to
Facebook profile content that the court did not address. First, it
addresses whether certain profile content is “electronic
communication” under the SCA. Second, it determines whether
Facebook acts as either an ECS or RCS with respect to that profile
content.
1. Facebook Profile Content Is Electronic Communication Under the
Stored Communications Act
There is a preliminary question: what content can be properly
deemed “communication”?130 The SCA only protects “electronic
127. See EEOC v. Simply Storage Mgmt., LLC, 270 F.R.D. 430, 432 n.1 (S.D.
Ind. 2010) (interpreting “profile” to mean “any content—including postings,
pictures, blogs, messages, personal information, lists of ‘friends’ or causes
joined—that the user has placed or created online by using her user account”).
128. See Facebook, Facebook’s Privacy Policy (Dec. 22, 2010),
http://www.facebook.com/policy.php (last visited Apr. 10, 2012) (explaining
Facebook’s privacy policy) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
129. Id.
130. See Witte, supra note 112, at 900 (“[I]t is possible that the Stored
Communications Act, which only protects communications from disclosure, may
prohibit these [social networking] websites from divulging the other contents of
someone’s page, such as photos, the individual’s ‘wall,’ . . . ‘friends,’ or other data
displayed on the page.”). Witte also notes that he “could find no case addressing
the issue of whether social networking sites fall within the scope of the Stored
Communications Act.” Id. Witte’s article was published just prior to the Crispin
decision.
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communication” from disclosure.131 The statute defines “electronic
communication” as “any transfer of signs, signals, writing, images,
sounds, data, or intelligence of any nature transmitted in whole or in
part by a wire, radio, electromagnetic, photoelectronic or photooptical
system.”132 The Crispin court held that sufficiently private wall posts
and comments and private messages are protected under the SCA as
electronic communication.133 The Viacom court held that YouTube
videos were protected and, if only implicitly, deemed the videos
“communication.”134
Given the broad definition of electronic communication in
§ 2510(12), it is likely that all profile content of a Facebook page
would be protected by the SCA as “electronic communication.”135 A
user’s status updates and profile information are all “written” and
thus within § 2510(12).136 It seems relevant that the Crispin court did
not even find it necessary to address whether the wall posts and
comments were electronic communications.137
Photos would be covered by the term “images.” While videos are
not explicitly mentioned, this is in all likelihood not an intentional
omission but instead indicative of the technology in 1986, when
131. See 18 U.S.C. § 2702(a)(1) (2006) (“[An ECS] shall not knowingly
divulge to any person or entity the contents of a communication while in
electronic storage by that service.”); id. § 2702(a)(2) (“[An RCS] shall not
knowingly divulge to any person or entity the contents of any communication
which is carried or maintained on that service.”).
132. Id. § 2510(12).
133. See Crispin v. Christian Audigier, Inc., 717 F. Supp. 2d 965, 991 (C.D.
Cal. 2010) (holding plaintiff’s private messages protected under the SCA and
remanding the wall posts and comments issue for a determination of privacy
settings). The court did not specifically address whether the messages were
electronic communication, but this determination was indeed necessary to reach
the holding.
134. See Viacom Int’l Inc. v. YouTube, 253 F.R.D. 256, 265 (S.D.N.Y. 2008)
(holding that plaintiffs cannot compel YouTube to produce “private” user videos
because YouTube is prohibited from doing so under the ECPA).
135. See 18 U.S.C. § 2510(12) (2006) (defining “electronic communication” as
“any transfer of signs, signals, writing, images, sounds, data, or intelligence of
any nature transmitted in whole or in part by a wire, radio, electromagnetic,
photoelectronic or photooptical system”).
136. Id.
137. See Crispin, 717 F. Supp. 2d at 988–91 (applying the SCA to the
subpoena requests for plaintiff’s Facebook wall posts and MySpace comments
but neglecting to address whether such information was “electronic
communication” within the Act).
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Congress enacted the ECPA. The Viacom court has already held that
the SCA protects videos (without discussing the threshold “electronic
communications” issue),138 and § 2510(12) covers videos without
straining the statutory text.139 It would be rather anomalous for the
SCA to protect “images” and not videos.
Whether a user’s list of “friends” is covered by § 2510(12)
presents a slightly more difficult problem. One could argue that
because a user’s friend is represented as a picture, it is within the
definition of an “image.” Names of friends, of course, are in “writing,”
and this could be another ground. A list of friends could arguably
even be deemed “data.” In any event, it is unlikely that a court would
hold that a user’s list of friends falls outside the electronic
communication definition in § 2510(12). In conclusion, despite the
peculiarities of Facebook profile content, all of it should be covered by
the SCA definition of “electronic communication.”
2. Facebook Acts as Both a RCS and an ECS
Next, it must be determined whether Facebook acts as a RCS or
an ECS with respect to profile content. The distinction is pertinent
because, under the SCA, disclosure protection levels differ based on
how content is classified.140 How the content is classified then
determines whether an entity is acting as a RCS or an ECS.141 If
Facebook is neither an ECS or a RCS with respect to this profile
content, then SCA protection is unavailable and only Fourth
Amendment protections apply.142
138. See Viacom, 253 F.R.D. at 265 (holding that YouTube videos protected
by the SCA, but not discussing whether those videos are “electronic
communication” within the Act).
139. See 18 U.S.C. § 2510(12) (2006) (defining “electronic communication” as
“any transfer of signs, signals, writing, images, sounds, data, or intelligence of
any nature transmitted in whole or in part by a wire, radio, electromagnetic,
photoelectronic or photooptical system”).
140. See id. §§ 2702–2703 (providing voluntary and required disclosure rules
for the various content covered by the SCA); see also Kerr, supra note 9, at
1222–23 (explaining the basic disclosure rules of the SCA).
141. See 18 U.S.C. §§ 2702–2703 (2006) (providing the disclosure rules
governing RCS and ECS).
142. See Kerr, supra note 9, at 1213 (“If the provider fits within [the ECS or
RCS definitions], the SCA protects the communication; otherwise, only Fourth
Amendment protections apply.”).

APPLYING THE STORED COMMUNICATIONS ACT

1283

The Crispin court, in an alternative holding, held Facebook and
MySpace to be RCS providers supplying remote storage for the wall
posts and comments.143 In Viacom the court found that YouTube was
acting as a RCS because it “stored the video on a web page for the
benefit of the user and those the user designates,” and the private
videos sought were “accessible to a limited set of users selected by the
poster and . . . stored on a page provided by the website.”144 Like in
Viacom, the wall postings and comments in Crispin were stored on
Facebook’s website for the user, subject to the user’s privacy
settings.145
Applying the Crispin and Viacom logic, Facebook acts as a RCS
regarding personal profile information (relationship status, religious
views, birth date, contact information, etc.) on a user profile.146
Personal profile information, like the wall posts and comments in
Crispin and the videos in Viacom, is stored on Facebook’s website,
and access is limited as selected by the user.147 Accordingly, these
different aspects of a user’s profile content should be subject to the
same analysis that the Crispin court applied to wall posts and
comments. That is, the user’s privacy settings determine whether the
requested information could be subpoenaed under the SCA under the
“readily available to the general public” standard.148
There is a counterargument that Facebook is acting as an ECS
rather than a RCS. Indeed, the Crispin court first held that Facebook
and MySpace were acting as ECSs with respect to the wall posts and

143. See Crispin v. Christian Audigier, Inc., 717 F. Supp. 2d 965, 990 (C.D.
Cal. 2010) (holding, in the alternative, that Facebook and MySpace are RCS
providers with respect to wall postings and comments).
144. Id.
145. See id. (“The private videos whose production plaintiff sought to compel
[in Viacom] are thus analogous to the Facebook wall postings and MySpace
comments defendants seek here, in that both are accessible to a limited set of
users selected by the poster and are stored on a page provided by the website.”).
146. Id.
147. See Facebook, Controlling How You Share, http://www.facebook.com/
privacy/explanation.php (last visited Apr. 10, 2012) (discussing various types of
personal profile information a user can add and how the user can restrict
viewing access to such content) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law
Review).
148. See Crispin, 717 F. Supp. 2d at 991 (remanding for a determination of
privacy settings to decide whether the plaintiff’s wall posts and comments could
be subpoenaed).
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comments149 and only alternatively held that the entities were acting
as RCSs.150 But under Crispin and Konop, the ECS argument is less
persuasive for personal profile information. Personal profile
information is closer to the RCS distinction in Viacom than the ECS
distinction in Konop.151 Unlike the private electronic bulletin board in
Konop, only the user can post his personal information to his profile
page.152 The bulletin board in Konop, in contrast, allowed for multiple
users to post information.153 A user’s posting of personal profile
information is therefore more similar to the YouTube user in Viacom
who posts videos to his account; both users are solely in control of how
and what content is posted, and accordingly, a social networking site
acts as a RCS with respect to storage of this information.
The ECS argument is more persuasive when analyzing an
outside user’s post on the user’s Facebook wall. The Crispin court
analogized the wall posts and comments to the secure website
containing an electronic bulletin board in Konop and found that
Facebook and MySpace were ECS providers providing electronic
storage for backup purposes.154 The Crispin court reasoned that the
passive action of failing to delete a bulletin board post in Konop,
which resulted in the post being stored for backup purposes, was
analogous to the storage of wall postings and comments.155 Like the
149. See id. at 989 (holding that “Facebook and MySpace are ECS providers
as respects wall postings and comments and that such communications are in
electronic storage” for backup purposes).
150. See id. at 990 (“In the alternative, the court holds that Facebook and
MySpace are RCS providers as respects wall postings and comments.”).
151. Compare Konop v. Hawaiian Airlines, Inc., 302 F.3d 868, 880 (9th Cir.
2002) (holding that a website providing a private electronic bulletin board is
acting as an ECS), with Viacom Int’l Inc. v. YouTube, 253 F.R.D. 256, 264
(S.D.N.Y. 2008) (holding YouTube to be a RCS with respect to its storage of
videos for a user).
152. Facebook, Controlling How You Share, http://www.facebook.com/
privacy/explanation.php (last visited Apr. 10, 2012) (on file with the Washington
and Lee Law Review).
153. See Konop, 302 F.3d at 872 (describing how access to the electronic
bulletin board was limited to users made eligible by Konop).
154. See Crispin, 717 F. Supp. 2d at 989 (holding that “Facebook and
MySpace are ECS providers as respects wall postings and comments and that
such communications are in electronic storage” for backup purposes); id. (“This
reading of Konop is consistent with Theofel and Quon, which held that email
messages and pager text-messages, were held for backup purposes once read.”).
155. See id. (“[I]t appears that the passive action of failing to delete a BBS
post, which is in all material ways analogous to a Facebook wall posting or a
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electronic bulletin board in Konop, multiple users can post to a user’s
profile wall, assuming the user has set privacy settings allowing other
users to do so.156 Accordingly, under the Konop and Crispin logic,
when a user posts on another user’s wall, the failure to delete that
post makes Facebook an ECS providing backup protection with
respect to the recipient user’s wall posts.157
Unfortunately, the distinction is meaningless in the context of
civil litigation. The SCA prohibits a public ECS or RCS from
voluntarily disclosing the content of a user’s communication, barring
an exception not relevant here.158 So, when it is determined that a
user’s Facebook content is protected because the site is acting as an
ECS or a RCS, we get the same result: the covered content that is not
readily available to the general public is protected. What matters
here is that Facebook fits both the RCS or ECS definition rules so
that user content is protected, assuming the content is sufficiently
private. The ECS/RCS distinction is more pertinent in the criminal
context, where the rules governing compelled disclosure have been
widely criticized.159
MySpace comment, also results in that post being stored for backup purposes.”).
156. See Facebook, Controlling How You Share, http://www.facebook.com/
privacy/explanation.php (last visited Apr. 10, 2012) (explaining how a user can
control the use of his profile wall) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law
Review).
157. See Crispin, 717 F. Supp. 2d at 989 (explaining that, under Konop, “it
appears that the passive action of failing to delete a BBS post, which is in all
material ways analogous to a Facebook wall posting or MySpace comments, also
results in that post being stored for backup purposes”).
158. See 18 U.S.C. § 2702(b) (2006) (providing voluntary disclosure rules and
exceptions). Section 2703 provides the disclosure rules for when the government
compels information from an ECS or a RCS, and these can vary from a search
warrant requirement to no restriction at all, based on the type of content. Id.
§ 2703. Apparently, when a civil litigant subpoenas an ECS or a RCS, the
voluntary disclosure rules, not the compelled disclosure rules, apply despite the
court’s participation (as the “government”) in the process. Also, the SCA does
not prohibit voluntary disclosure by nonpublic providers. Id. § 2702.
159. See, e.g., Kerr, supra note 9, at 1233 (“The most obvious problem with
the current version of the SCA is the surprisingly weak protection the statute
affords to compelled contents of communications under the traditional
understanding of ECS and RCS.”); Digital Due Process, Comments to NTIA in
the Matter of Information Privacy and Innovation in the Internet Economy 1
(June 14, 2010), available at http://www.digitaldueprocess.org/files/NTIA_NOI_
061410.pdf (arguing that “[t]he government should obtain a search warrant
based on probable cause before it can compel a service provider to disclose a
user’s private communications or documents stored online”). One court has even
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C. Determining at What Point in Time Privacy Settings Matter
Accompanying the privacy settings issue is the question of
exactly when the settings should be taken into account.160 The point
in time a user’s privacy settings matter will probably depend on the
nature of each individual case. For example, using the hypothetical in
the introduction, assume Larry’s Facebook profile was fully public
when he posted about his post-injury ski trip. Then, assume during
the middle of his lawsuit, Larry privatized his profile before Vanessa
subpoenaed Facebook. What is the relevant time in determining what
his privacy settings are and thus whether his profile content can be
subpoenaed under the SCA?
Presumably, the latest time a user’s privacy settings would be
relevant is at the time of a subpoena to the social networking site. On
the other hand, Vanessa could argue the relevant time is the time of
Larry’s posts. Crispin did not offer the lower court any guidance on
this point, and at present the answer is unclear.161
Social networking sites may or may not keep track of when a
user changes his privacy settings. If Vanessa could prove a change in
Larry’s privacy settings through information from Facebook, she
could then argue that the court should apply the privacy settings
analysis when he posted the relevant information. Otherwise,
Vanessa would have to resort to obtaining evidence of the past public
or private nature of Larry’s profile herself.

ruled some of the compelled disclosure requirements unconstitutional. See
United States v. Warshak, 631 F.3d 266, 288 (6th Cir. 2010) (holding that “a
subscriber enjoys a reasonable expectation of privacy in the contents of emails”
stored with or sent through an Internet service provider). As a result, “[t]he
government may not compel a commercial ISP to turn over the contents of a
subscriber’s emails without first obtaining a warrant based on probable cause.”
Id.
160. See Klein et al., supra note 116, at 19 (“May a user avoid discovery
simply by modifying his or her settings at the time of trial?”); Petersen, supra
note 76, at 27–28 (analyzing Crispin and asking whether “a user involved in
litigation [can] make critical information inaccessible simply by changing
privacy settings on his or her Facebook or MySpace pages”).
161. See Crispin, 717 F. Supp. 2d at 991 (noting that a “review of the
plaintiff’s privacy settings would definitively settle the question” of whether the
plaintiff’s wall posts and comments could be subpoenaed, but providing no
further guidance as to what point in time the privacy settings should be taken
into account).
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There is an argument that a user’s change in privacy settings
violates a preservation obligation.162 Parties (or future parties)
generally have a duty to preserve relevant evidence once they are
reasonably aware of the possibility of impending litigation.163 A
Facebook user who privatizes his Facebook profile after a lawsuit has
been filed could arguably be “destroying” relevant evidence and be
subject to sanction.164 Again, on this point, the law is unclear.
VI. Proposed Legislative Reform
While the previous Part outlined how courts should approach
social networking sites under the current version of the SCA, this
Part proposes SCA legislative reform. ECPA (and SCA) reform is at
the door of both Congressional houses.165 The SCA should be
reformed for two reasons. First, it unnecessarily distinguishes
between RCS and ECS, a now irrelevant distinction that only serves
to confuse the courts.166 Second, the current SCA fails to provide an
exception for civil litigants, which, if added, would lessen the burdens
on service providers and courts and clarify discovery standards for
civil litigants.167

162. See Witte, supra note 112, at 901 (arguing that social networking site
information should be preserved when an individual believes it could be
relevant to a foreseeable or ongoing lawsuit).
163. See FED. R. CIV. P. 37(f) advisory committee’s note (describing when a
preservation obligation may arise); 8B CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT ET AL., FEDERAL
PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 2284.1 (3d ed. 2008) (describing the preservation
obligation as related to electronically stored information).
164. See Witte, supra note 112, at 895 (arguing that there is a preservation
obligation with respect to the contents of social networking sites).
165. See generally The Electronic Communications Privacy Act: Promoting
Security and Protecting Privacy in the Digital Age: Hearing Before the S. Comm.
on the Judiciary, 111th Cong. (2010); Electronic Communications Privacy Act
Reform: Hearing Before the H. Subcomm. on the Constitution, Civil Rights, and
Civil Liberties, 111th Cong. (2010); ECPA Reform and the Revolution of Location
Based Technologies and Services: Hearing Before the H. Subcomm. on the
Constitution, Civil Rights, and Civil Liberties, 111th Cong. (2010); ECPA
Reform and the Revolution in Cloud Computing: Hearing Before the H.
Subcomm. on the Constitution, Civil Rights, and Civil Liberties, 111th Cong.
(2010).
166. Infra Part VI.A.
167. Infra Part VI.B.
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A. Collapse the ECS/RCS Distinction

First, the ECS and RCS distinction should be eliminated because
it no longer provides any functional purpose and unnecessarily
occupies the time of courts and litigants. This is not a new
suggestion.168 Professor Orin Kerr authored a 2004 law review article
providing a “legislator’s guide” to the SCA and has suggested that the
SCA be rewritten so that it applies only to “network service
providers.”169 While this Note generally agrees with Kerr’s argument,
it proposes that it should be refined to include the recent
developments with respect to Crispin and the SCA’s application to
social networking sites.
Kerr’s proposal would eliminate the distinction that is based on
the function a provider performs and would instead “distinguish
among the files a provider holds based on its function with respect to
that file.”170 It is unclear whether Kerr’s proposal would include social
networking sites within the definition of network service providers.
The SCA should be amended to collapse the ECS/RCS distinction
into the single category of “network service provider,” but the
“network service provider” definition should include social networking
sites. In the wake of Crispin, we know that social networking sites
are governed by the SCA, and these sites should continue to be
protected under any new legislation and included within a new
unifying definition.171 This reform would retain the intent of the
original statute while simplifying the text for courts.172 It would also
promote judicial economy; courts, like the one in Crispin, would no
longer have to unnecessarily labor over the ECS/RCS distinction.173
168. See Kerr, supra note 9, at 1235 (“Congress could eliminate the
confusing categories of ECS and RCS and simply incorporate these concepts into
the statute directly.”).
169. See id. (“Congress could rewrite the statute so that the SCA applied to
only ‘network service providers,’ which could be defined using a combination of
the current definitions of ECS and RCS.”).
170. Id. Professor Kerr provides the text of proposed statutory language. Id.
at 1235–38.
171. See Crispin, 717 F. Supp. 2d at 971 (applying the SCA to subpoenas
directed to Facebook, MySpace, and Media Temple).
172. See Kerr, supra note 9, at 1237–38 (noting that collapsing the ECS and
RCS distinction would simplify the text without losing functionality in both
§ 2703 and § 2702 of the SCA).
173. See Sidoti et al., supra note 26, at 8 (“One need look no further than the
legal acrobatics that the Crispin court and others have employed to determine
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This proposition finds further support in the civil litigation context
because despite the distinction (ECS or RCS) given to a social
networking site, the same protections apply.174
B. Include an Exception in the Stored Communications Act for Civil
Litigants
Second, the statute should provide a disclosure exception for civil
litigants. Currently, the SCA bans ECS and RCS from voluntarily
disclosing “content” information when subpoenaed by civil litigants175
unless such information is “readily available to the general public.”176
In our hypothetical, this means that, under current law, Vanessa
could not subpoena the “content” (or substance) of Larry’s messages,
wall posts, status updates, videos, photos, or profile information if this
content is (or was) sufficiently private. Including a disclosure
exception in the SCA for civil litigants would allow parties, in certain
circumstances, to subpoena content information from a service
provider or social networking site. A specified disclosure exception
would clarify discovery standards for both courts and litigants while
lessening the burden on providers and sites subject to the SCA. This
Note argues that Congress should adopt a modified version of Marc
Zwillinger and Christian Genetski’s proposed disclosure exception
amendment discussed below.
In a 2007 article, Zwillinger and Genetski argue that the SCA
creates an “uneven playing field” regarding the standards governing
“[Internet service providers’] disclosure of Internet communications
that turn on the nature of the information sought and the identity of
the person seeking it.”177 In short, when the government seeks
whether . . . Facebook or MySpace is an ECS and/or RCS provider to conclude
that the SCA is outdated . . . .”).
174. See supra note 158 and accompanying text (describing how the
ECS/RCS distinction is irrelevant in relation to the level of voluntary disclosure
protection given to user content).
175. See 18 U.S.C. § 2702 (2006) (providing the requirements the
government must meet to force disclosure of “content” information).
176. See id. § 2511(2)(g) (“It shall not be unlawful under [the SCA] for any
person . . . to intercept or access an electronic communication made through an
electronic communication system that is configured so that such electronic
communication is readily accessible to the general public.”).
177. Zwillinger & Genetski, supra note 9, at 590.
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information from an Internet service provider (ISP) under the SCA,
the information is subject to qualified privacy protection, depending
on the type of information sought.178 In contrast, when a criminal
defendant or civil litigant seeks information from an ISP under the
SCA, “content” information is absolutely protected, while “noncontent” information is afforded no protection at all.179
When the government seeks content information (for example,
the substance of an e-mail) it must meet the statutory
requirements.180 A criminal defendant or civil litigant, on the other
hand, cannot compel content information directly from an ISP
without requesting the government to compel the information for
them.181 But noncontent information (such as “IP addresses of
government informants, the buddy lists of alleged co-conspirators, or
the identity of an insulting poster to a message board”182) is more
easily accessed by the criminal defendant or civil litigant because the
SCA provides exceptions to disclosure of noncontent information to
“any person other than a governmental entity.”183
In practice, Zwillinger and Genetski argue, the advantage that
nongovernment entities may have in compelling noncontent
information is largely gone.184 While the SCA does not restrict ISPs
178. See id. (“If the government is the seeker, then non-content and content
information are both given qualified privacy protection along a sliding scale in
which the privacy of content is more closely guarded.”); see also 18 U.S.C.
§§ 2702–2703 (2006) (providing the requirements the government must meet to
force disclosure of content and noncontent information).
179. See Zwillinger & Genetski, supra note 9, at 590 (“If, however, the
seeker is a criminal defendant or civil litigant, then content is afforded absolute
privacy protection, and non-content is afforded no protection at all.”); see also 18
U.S.C. § 2702(c)(6) (2006) (allowing a provider to divulge noncontent
information to “any person other than a governmental entity”).
180. See 18 U.S.C. § 2702(b) (2006) (providing the requirements the
government must meet to force disclosure of content information).
181. See Zwillinger & Genetski, supra note 9, at 593 (“[D]efendants may . . .
ask the government to intercede and compel disclosure of the communications
and then turn them over to defendants upon receipt.”). Zwillinger and Genetski
note the problems associated with this method: “[A]ny attempt by criminal
defendants to enlist the courts to force the government’s hand in issuing process
raises serious separation of powers issues.” Id.
182. Id. at 590.
183. 18 U.S.C. § 2702 (2006).
184. See Zwillinger & Genetski, supra note 9, at 590 (“[A]ny benefit to
defendant’s of the SCA’s free pass for disclosures of non-content information has
been more or less eroded by voluntary privacy practices of ISPs.”).
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from divulging noncontent information, the ISPs have self-imposed
privacy policies that “promise users the ISP will not disclose their
information to any third party absent legal process.”185 As a
consequence, in practice, criminal defendants and civil litigants must
get a subpoena or court order to get noncontent information—the
same limitations imposed on the government.186 In sum, the
government is advantaged when requesting content information, and
all parties are on equal footing when requesting noncontent
information.
Zwillinger and Genetski propose an amendment187 that they
believe would “harmonize the interest of the criminal defendant, civil
litigant, subscriber, and ISP.”188 The proposed showing would be
similar to what SCA § 2703(d) requires.189 This proposed amendment
185. Id.
186. See id. at 591 (“The playing field for non-content information, as a
matter of ISP policy, is leveled.”).
187. See id. at 597–98 (proposing an SCA amendment that provides an
exception for civil and criminal litigants). The text of the proposed amendment
is as follows:
A non-governmental entity who is a party to pending criminal or civil
litigation may petition the court in which such litigation is pending
for an order requiring a service provider to disclose contents of
electronic communications in electronic storage or contents of wire or
electronic communications in a remote computing service and such
order shall issue only if the requesting party can demonstrate that
the requested information is relevant and material to the ongoing
litigation and is unavailable from other sources, and both the
subscriber or customer whose materials are sought and the service
provider from whom the materials will be produced are provided
reasonable notice and the opportunity to be heard. In the case of a
State court, such a court order shall not issue if prohibited by the law
of such state. A court issuing an order pursuant to this section, on a
motion made promptly by the service provider, may quash or modify
such order, if the information or records requested are unusually
voluminous in nature, or compliance with such an order would cause
an undue burden on such provider. In all cases, the service provider
shall be entitled to cost reimbursement by the requesting party, as
set forth in 18 U.S.C. § 2706.
Id.
188. Id. at 598.
189. Id. at 597; see also 18 U.S.C. § 2703(d) (2006) (“A court order . . . shall
issue only if the governmental entity offers specific and articulable facts
showing that there are reasonable grounds to believe that the contents of a wire
or electronic communication, or the records or other information sought, are
relevant and material to an ongoing criminal investigation.”).
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has several benefits: it provides notice and an opportunity to be heard
to the subscriber and service provider before disclosure, it preserves
the ECPA’s preference for serving a subpoena on the subscriber or
customer before the ISP (or social networking site), and it protects the
interests of the ISP (or social networking site) by allowing it to move
to quash or modify an order and to recover reasonable costs.190
The proposed amendment should be modified slightly. Discovery
rules can vary by jurisdiction, and the amendment should account for
this. For example, it could include this phrase: “The court issuing an
order under this section shall determine relevancy and materiality
according to the law of its jurisdiction.” Case law can also vary by
jurisdiction as to what constitutes an “undue burden” on a service
provider, so Congress should add a similar provision regarding the
determination of an undue burden.
Returning to our hypothetical, this exception would allow
Vanessa to subpoena Facebook for the content of Larry’s Facebook
profile if she could prove that the information was both relevant and
material to her case and unavailable from other sources. Reasonable
notice and opportunity to be heard would also have to be given to
Larry and Facebook. Facebook would be allowed to move to quash
any order that it believed would be an undue burden. Finally,
Facebook could get cost reimbursement from Vanessa as the
requesting party.
This disclosure exception would give courts and litigants clear
standards on what governs a request for information that would
otherwise be protected by the SCA. It would also require a party to
exhaust other sources of the requested content,191 thus lessening the
burden on service providers. Finally, it would still preserve the
privacy of nonparties who are not subject to the information sharing
that is required of litigants.
VII. Conclusion
For now, courts must trudge through the 1986 version of the
SCA to apply its statutory categories to modern-era social networking
sites. Whether social networking sites are acting as an ECS or a RCS
190.
191.
sites).

Zwillinger & Genetski, supra note 9, at 598.
See infra Part IV (discussing the general discovery of social networking
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regarding a user’s content, that content should be protected from
voluntary disclosure so long as it is not “readily available to the
general public.”
In reforming the SCA, Congress should collapse the ECS/RCS
distinction and include social networking sites within a singular
entity definition. This would allow courts to avoid the unnecessary
deliberation and confusion that accompanies determining whether a
site like Facebook acts as an ECS or a RCS. This would also preserve
the functional purposes of the SCA without undermining any of its
protections.
Further, without an exception for civil litigants, the SCA has
caused unnecessary confusion for courts and parties alike. Congress
should include such an exception that allows parties, after exhausting
other remedies, to obtain social networking site information that is
relevant to the ongoing litigation. Any such exception should allow
courts to conform discovery procedures to local rules. As a result, the
standards governing disclosure of social networking content would be
much clearer for courts and litigants while still preserving SCA
privacy protections for nonparties.
Congress seems poised to revamp the SCA in the near future; the
legislature would serve the legal system well to bring the SCA out of
the technological Stone Age and in line with modern innovations.

